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AbstrACt
Objectives The Computer-Aided Risk Score (CARS) 
estimates the risk of death following emergency admission 
to medical wards using routinely collected vital signs 
and blood test data. Our aim was to elicit the views of 
healthcare practitioners (staff) and service users and 
carers (SU/C) on (1) the potential value, unintended 
consequences and concerns associated with CARS and 
practitioner views on (2) the issues to consider before 
embedding CARS into routine practice.
setting This study was conducted in two National Health 
Service (NHS) hospital trusts in the North of England. Both 
had in-house information technology (IT) development 
teams, mature IT infrastructure with electronic National 
Early Warning Score (NEWS) and were capable of 
integrating NEWS with blood test results. The study 
focused on emergency medical and elderly admissions 
units. There were 60 and 39 acute medical/elderly 
admissions beds at the two NHS hospital trusts.
Participants We conducted eight focus groups with 45 
healthcare practitioners and two with 11 SU/Cs in two NHS 
acute hospitals.
results Staff and SU/Cs recognised the potential of 
CARS but were clear that the score should not replace 
or undermine clinical judgments. Staff recognised that 
CARS could enhance clinical decision-making/judgments 
and aid communication with patients. They wanted to 
understand the components of CARS and be reassured 
about its accuracy but were concerned about the impact 
on intensive care and blood tests.
Conclusion Risk scores are widely used in healthcare, 
but their development and implementation do not usually 
involve input from practitioners and SU/Cs. We contributed 
to the development of CARS by eliciting views of staff and 
SU/Cs who provided important, often complex, insights 
to support the development and implementation of CARS 
to ensure successful implementation in routine clinical 
practice.
IntrOduCtIOn 
A UK-wide study of 10 hospitals estimated 
5% of deaths were preventable and 30% 
of these were attributable to poor clinical 
monitoring.1 If risk of death information 
was available to clinical staff, it was likely to 
enhance patient safety2; however, there are 
no established risk equations for acutely 
admitted medical patients. Furthermore, 
while several studies have considered the 
use of physiological signs or blood tests in 
the assessment of patient, few consider 
combining the two.2 Although National 
Early Warning Score (NEWS) is known 
to predict mortality in the hospital and 
prehospital setting,3 it is not suitable for 
some groups of patients.4 This research 
team therefore developed a novel Comput-
er-Aided Risk Score (CARS) for estimating 
the risk of in-hospital mortality following 
emergency medical admission to hospital5 in 
two hospitals. CARS was designed to rely on 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► Our research takes a rare approach of including 
healthcare practitioner and service user/carer (SU/C) 
involvement in the development of a risk score.
 ► Finding adequate time for practitioner input was 
hard and we needed flexible approaches to focus 
group recruitment, venues and timings.
 ► Staff and SU/C input was largely a process of our 
consulting with the group. A codesign approach 
may have enhanced the benefits of stakeholder 
involvement.
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variables already routinely collected and electronically 
recorded as part of the process of care including vital 
signs data (based on a NEWS)6 and blood test results.7 
CARS demonstrated better discrimination and calibra-
tion than blood tests and NEWS separately.5 
Despite the widespread use of risk scores to enhance 
decision-making in healthcare, as identified by Braband 
et al,2 there is little or no documentary evidence of the 
involvement of healthcare practitioners and service 
users or carers (SU/Cs) in the design, development and 
implementation of this type of risk score. Our research 
responds to this gap.
Concurrent to the statistical modelling work, we 
conducted focus groups with healthcare practitioners 
and SU/Cs to feed into the ongoing development of 
CARS. The aims of the focus groups were to establish (1) 
healthcare practitioner (hereafter ‘staff’) and SU/C views 
on the potential value, unintended consequences and 
concerns associated with the development of the CARS 
and (2) staff views on how CARS should be adopted in 
practice/implementation needs.
MethOds
Patient and public involvement
All participants gave signed consent after receiving 
written information about the study. The ‘Service User 
and Carer Involvement in Research Group’ at the Univer-
sity of Bradford supported the project as members of 
the project steering group and as a focus group advisory 
team. Their contribution included codesign of project 
materials, support of the methodology (eg, recruitment 
strategies) and offering comments and suggestions based 
on data gathered.
Participants
This study was conducted in two National Health Service 
(NHS) hospital trusts in the North of England (referred 
to hereafter as trust A and trust B). Both had in-house 
information technology (IT) development teams, mature 
IT infrastructure with electronic NEWS and were capable 
of integrating NEWS with blood test results. The study 
focused on emergency medical and elderly admissions 
units. There were 60 and 39 acute medical/elderly admis-
sions beds at trusts A and B, respectively.
SU/Cs were competent adults (aged over 18 years) 
who were members of the public, who had either been 
in hospital themselves any time in their adult life, or 
who had experienced a relative in hospital. Staff were 
any practitioner working in areas where we intended to 
implement CARS (acute assessment units, medical wards 
and older person in-patient units) or acute outreach staff 
(nurse or doctor called on to offer advanced assessment 
and input) were eligible. Due to the additional aim of the 
staff groups (implementation needs), we held separate 
SU/C and staff focus groups.
design
Ten focus groups were held over two rounds in each trust 
(eight staff groups and two SU/C groups). A first round of 
staff and SU/C focus groups was conducted at the begin-
ning of CARS development and commenced with a brief 
presentation about CARS, its rationale and development, 
then asked participants for their thoughts, feelings and 
concerns in relation to implementation of a CARS at their 
hospitals. Focus group schedules were informed by the 
literature relating to other risk scores (eg, NEWS). Results 
from focus groups were fed back to the CARS research 
team who then further developed CARS and its implemen-
tation package (figure 1 illustrates round one focus group 
questions). Subsequently, a second round of focus groups 
with staff explored CARS implementation needs in greater 
depth. After a presentation about CARS, vignettes were 
used (developed from case note reviews), to allow staff to 
understand how CARS scores relate to real clinical scenarios 
(figure 2 offers an example of a vignette and round two 
focus group questions). It was our intention to run groups 
of between 6 and 12 participants. Due to the challenges of 
staff time and availability, this was revised to smaller group 
sizes for the second staff focus groups. JD led staff focus 
groups, CM led SU/C groups and NJ supported all groups 
(none of whom had a previous relationship with partici-
pants and all were experienced in running focus groups).
Procedure
CM approached the patient experience leads at each 
hospital as a gatekeeper for recruitment to SU/Cs. 
Patient experience leads contacted members of their 
forums through email, posters and verbal invites. Inter-
ested people contacted CM directly and were given 
participant information sheets before deciding to attend. 
Clinical partners from the CARS implementation teams 
at both hospitals introduced JD and NJ (electronically 
or in person) to the nurse in charge of relevant hospital 
areas. Charge nurses circulated email invitations to qual-
ified medical and nursing staff of all grades with partic-
ipant information. They contacted the research team if 
they were interested in participating. All interested SU/C 
and staff were included.
The first round of focus groups (SU/C and staff) took 
place over a 6-month period from May 2016 and the 
second staff focus groups occurred between May and July 
2017. For staff, careful recruitment identified a diverse 
range of participants in terms of their professional role 
and experience. There were slightly more medical staff, 
which was expected given the relevance of the score. We 
expected focus groups including 25 participants within 
groups would be enough to achieve data saturation.8 With 
one exception, all focus groups took place in hospital 
meeting rooms or offices. The exception was one staff 
focus group, which took place at a conference centre (for 
the convenience of staff).
Analysis
Focus groups were audio recorded and transcribed 
verbatim and transcripts imported into NVivo V.11 data 
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management software. Data were subject to thematic 
analysis.9 An inductive approach generated themes. Data 
were coded by one main coder (JD) but to increase reli-
ability of analysis SU/C focus groups data were also coded 
by CM and a sample of staff focus group data coded by 
NJ. Coding was sentence by sentence to allow accurate 
comparison. Differences in coding were discussed and 
where necessary codes were redefined and the process 
repeated. On the second occasion, over 90% agreement 
was reached on codes allocated. Coding was according to 
the three areas of interest, value and unintended conse-
quences, concerns and implementation. Data saturation 
was achieved; no new codes were derived from data from 
the last two focus groups.
Figure 1 Focus group questions round 1. CARS, Computer-Aided Risk Score; SU/C, service user or carer.
Figure 2 Focus group content round 2. AKI, acute kidney injury; BP, blood pressure; CARS, Computer-Aided Risk Score; CKD, 
chronic kidney disease; IV, intravenous; NEWS, National Early Warning Score; T2DM, type 2 diabetes mellitus.
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results
Characteristics of the sample
SU/C groups in NHS trusts A and B involved six and five 
participants, respectively. The composition of the staff 
groups was according to figure 3; junior doctor refers to 
doctors in their first (FY1) or second (FY2) year post qual-
ification or registrar (first promotion post qualifying). 
Senior doctor refers to senior registrar (preconsultant 
grade) and consultant (most senior medical person). 
Grades of nurses include below six (five being the most 
junior post qualification nurse) and above six (seven 
charge nurse, eight matron and above nurse special-
ists or clinical managers). Allied professionals included 
physiotherapists and occupational therapists. We did not 
formally ask SU/Cs about the nature of their or their 
friend/relative’s hospital stay; however, examples given to 
support views offered suggests a wide range of experiences 
(eg, heart bypass surgery, caring at the end of life, chest 
infection and subsequent pneumonia). SU/Cs talked 
about admissions to the emergency department, inten-
sive care unit and both medical and surgical wards. There 
were eight staff focus groups with the number of partici-
pants ranging from 2 to 16 across both trusts. There were 
six and five participants in SU/C groups in trusts A and B, 
respectively. All participants contributed to focus groups. 
The duration of focus groups ranged between 22 min and 
1 hour 29 min, mean duration 57 min.
Overall findings
There were nine themes arranged according to the aims 
of the study, ‘value and unintended consequences’, 
‘concerns’ and ‘implementation’ represented in figure 4 
and elaborated below with verbatim quotes from a broad 
range of participants.
Value and unintended consequences
Decision-making and clinical judgement
Staff talked about the value of using CARS as a decision 
aid for choosing active or supportive care or for ‘do not 
resuscitate’ decisions.
…on admission… might help triage Sr Dr1 FG1
…decisions about end of life care as well; guide DNR 
[do not resuscitate] decision making Sr Dr3, FG1
This was considered within different contexts of care; in 
some areas a high score might suggest supportive care 
(eg, general medical areas) and in other areas (eg, paedi-
atrics) it would be expected even the smallest chance of 
survival suggests active care.
Figure 3 Staff focus group participants.
Figure 4 Themes resulting from data analysis according to the study aims. CARS, Computer-Aided Risk Score; NEWS, 
National Early Warning Score.
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some clinicians would say even half a percent chance 
of survival is enough… where do we draw the line? Sr 
Dr3, FG1
Staff considered the score would give them extra confi-
dence in making clinical decisions.
Having the CARS then makes you think no ok I am 
on the right way and it gives you a bit more confi-
dence Sr N1, FG3
I think CARS score, well all scoring systems are useful 
anyway as they are a starting point to see how sick 
your patient is, it’s a good way of just getting all the 
information in one go Sr Dr1, FG3
SU/C groups were similarly positive about its potential 
to play a role in improving patient safety because it could 
challenge clinician’s preconceived ideas and provide addi-
tional information for clinicians to make a judgement.
what I’ve seen is that they get this idea in their head 
of what’s wrong with you and this is perhaps a good 
way of making double check SU/C Trust B
Both staff and SU/Cs expressed concerns that clinical 
judgement may be undermined by the score. Staff discus-
sions focused on the appropriate ‘weight’ to give the 
score in the decision-making process particularly when 
the score and their own judgement conflicted.
We want the space to use that judgement… Jr Dr1 
FG1
With all of these things [scores] you stop taking a 
clinical interest in the patient and just look at the 
numbers NS1 FG2
as long as it’s another helpful factor in deciding what 
to do as opposed to being the determining factor 
SU/C Trust A
Litigation
Staff saw potential positive and negative elements to the 
score in terms of supporting their decisions or otherwise 
and the potential for litigation.
If you need to back up your clinical judgement to 
the coroner [the Computer Aided Risk Score] would 
help I think Sr Dr2 FG1
Someone is going to say, I am going to pore over those 
notes and find out why this person has died, whereas, 
they may not have done previously. Conversely this 
person had a high chance of dying, why did you carry 
on with your treatment which… was futile Sr Dr1 FG1
Communication
Most staff considered the score would aid or prompt 
communication with patients about prognosis. There was 
disagreement about it might be best to give the actual 
score or a description of the situation.
We tend to use more descriptive terms… patients are 
appreciative of honesty Sr Dr1 FG1
If he had a score, today this is how bad she actually 
is its likely going to be soon, that would have helped 
him deal with the situation better SU/C Trust A
SU/C participants talked at length about the score’s 
potential role in assisting communication about a 
patient’s condition, helping them accept the seriousness 
of the condition. However, there was much debate among 
both staff and SU/Cs about whether or not patients and 
carers should be actively informed of the score.
One of the biggest things in any hospital anywhere 
is communication and information they’re not told, 
and I’m sure they would like to be told SU/C Trust B
They [staff] are a little too tactful, little too polite, lit-
tle too sensitive. . the score might help’ SU/C Trust B
It was argued this score was primarily for clinicians 
and while it should not hidden, it need not be routinely 
provided in the same format for everyone.
I think if the family are told they are gravely ill that 
would be more human than they are an eight point 
four SR Dr1 FG2
Components of the algorithm/accuracy
Staff discussed at length the need to know the component 
parts of the score and access the latest contributing values. 
They were keen to know when CARS may or may not be 
accurate. Frequent examples offered of where CARS 
may not be accurate were chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, chronic kidney disease terminal conditions and 
congenital diseases.
I would like the people who are reviewing the score to 
be able to understand it properly. Otherwise you will 
get people who are becoming overly worried about it 
when they don’t actually, can’t interpret it and don’t 
understand it. Jr Dr1 FG5
What about COPD [Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disease]… at the same time people with significant 
co-morbidities will have a worse outcome? Jr Dr2 FG1
SU/C groups were also interested in exploring the 
accuracy of the score:
It needs to be sensitive both ways… otherwise every-
body will be in the high dependency unit SU/C Trust 
B
Resource implications
Staff raised questions about the potential resource needs 
associated with CARS, for example, intensive care unit 
beds and blood tests.
Can I just ask what sort of impact this will have on the 
labs? NS2 FG2
the extra expenditure… you have an ethical dilemma 
because you have a patient who’s got a score you’ve 
gone to escalating to HDU [High Dependency Unit], 
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ICU [Intensive Care Unit], high observations units. 
NS3 FG2
SU/C groups were also concerned about resources but 
this focused on extra workload and they were worried the 
score would mean less face-to-face care.
My concerns would be they’re already under extreme 
pressure, if this is going to be another assessment 
that they have got to carry out on patients that’s in-
creasing the pressure at a time when they’re already 
stressed out SU/C Trust B
Implementation
Presentation
Staff focus groups had ideas as to the presentation of 
CARS and the need to see the trend in the score.
If I were using it myself as a physician I would want a 
specific percentage Jr Dr1 FG1
 Putting it all together in a score is helpful when you 
are the person on call who doesn’t know them and 
you can see the trend of that score and it’s helpful. 
Jr Dr1 FG5
It would be useful to see it as a graph [trend] Jr Ns1 
FG8
When discussing presentation of the score, the SU/
Cs focused mainly on the communication of it by staff 
(reported above) and whether they should have direct 
access/sight of the score.
To see it change in front of your eyes that might be 
even more terrifying SU/C Trust A
CARS compared with NEWS
Staff appreciated that CARS was more sensitive than 
NEWS, and though they appreciated, unlike NEWS, the 
CARS was a complex statistical equation, not possible to 
calculate by hand, they were keen to see it.
Can you copy that algorithm? Can we have a look at 
that? NS3 FG2 Trust B
The key issue with respect to this comparison was the 
potential for CARS to suggest one action should be taken 
and NEWS suggests another (eg, one indicates escalation 
the other does not).
NEWS [National Early Warning Score] score high 
and CARS low or vice versa therefore we’ve then got a 
confusion to the people who are actually on the shop 
floor where one thing is telling them to do this escala-
tion and the other is saying you don’t need to O FG2
Staff considered the comparative utility of NEWS and 
CARS with a particular focus on whether blood tests 
would delay a calculation of the score, or, whether CARS 
would be updated when any new data item (eg, tempera-
ture/pulse) became available.
 [CARS unlike NEWS] it might take three or 4 hours… if 
it relies on blood tests Sr Dr3 FG1
Finally, there was indication staff wanted to see the 
score demonstrated to be effective in relation to people in 
addition to being mathematically valid.
Guidelines
Staff discussed the specific procedures for CARS’ role in 
confirming or support clinical judgement:
I don’t think you can use the CARS score as a trigger 
to make any specific clinical action, it is an alert that 
there may be a clinical problem there, there is a clini-
cal problem there and then you need to find out what 
it actually is, it may be you need to look more closely 
at the biochemistry or whatever, whereas, the NEWS 
score is more specific NS4 FG2
They initially suggested the need for an escalation 
protocol or guide (where actions are prescribed according 
to score).
…with the NEWS [National Early Warning Score] if 
you have a score of five an above obviously that is an 
escalation process whereas with the CARS we don’t 
know NS1 FG2
When vignettes were brought in during the second staff 
focus groups, staff were less likely to feel the need for an 
escalation protocol or a guide.
I don’t think it [CARS] changes the clinical man-
agement because the clinical management is always 
going to be based on the individual in front of you 
with their individual bloods and things. Putting it all 
together in a score is helpful Jr Dr2 FG5
Where staff wanted guidance, this was sometimes to 
protect against criticism about inappropriate response to 
a high CARS.
If there isn’t [a protoco], you go to the doctor and 
say the CARS has come up at this score, and they say 
yes that’s because. . . . . they would always have a ra-
tionale… but at least you are covering yourself Sr Ns1 
FG7
This was linked to concerns about litigation.
Then one day someone will turn around and say but 
the CARS score was 10 and you didn’t do this, so I 
think that’s just the world we live in and we have to 
have a clear role when we introduce it or otherwise… 
Jr1 Dr FG 5
Some felt the guidance would ensure (insist on) a 
response from a senior clinician.
You can say to the doctor look I am just following the 
protocol Sr Ns1 FG4
Others suggested that it would serve as support for 
more junior staff.
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Junior medical and nursing staff . . . I would worry 
that they would, that they might lack clinical prow-
ess Sr Dr3 FG3
Strategy
There was a lot of discussion about a strategy for 
implementation. One group (FG2) spent a lot of time 
discussing the need for a ‘champion’. This related to 
their experience with NEWS. The suggestion was one of 
the outreach team would be best placed for this. Discus-
sion took place about the extent of education required 
and there was a consensus that a hospital-wide strategy 
would be appropriate.
We need people to champion this O FG2
The big nooks and crooks is going to be education, 
needs training, information as well. If you’re just 
looking at one area, there are medical people coming 
through that area teams to you need to target them 
all. Sr Dr1 FG2
dIsCussIOn
Our approach in developing CARS has been coworking 
with front-line staff and SU/Cs as part of the project team 
as well as participants. We conducted 10 focus groups 
with 11 SU/Cs and 45 healthcare practitioners in two 
NHS acute hospitals. Participants were interested in the 
development of the CARS score and appreciated such 
efforts to improve patient safety at their hospital. They 
recognised the potential of CARS but were clear that the 
score should not replace or undermine clinical judg-
ments. Staff recognised that CARS could enhance clinical 
decision-making and aid communication. They wanted 
to understand the components of CARS and be reas-
sured about its accuracy and were concerned about the 
impact on resources. Staff preferred CARS to be shown 
as a score (without descriptive labels) graphed by time to 
monitor changes. Staff needed clarity on how CARS and 
NEWS would work alongside each other. SU/C has mixed 
views about the extent to the score should be shared with 
patients.
As far as we are aware, previous studies on the design, 
development and implementation of risk scores have 
not reported on the views of staff and SU/C, so we are 
unable to determine the extent implementation of 
these risk-scoring systems into routine clinical practice 
that requires careful consideration of the views of staff 
and patients. However, our broad recruitment and data 
saturation suggests that our findings may be generalis-
able to the implementation of risk scores elsewhere. The 
themes identified highlight that risk scores are complex 
interventions introduced into complex adaptive systems 
and the voice of staff and SU/C is an important element 
of codesign. The contribution of staff and SU/C was inte-
gral and iterative to the design of CARS and led to some 
important insights and design changes including: (1) 
CARS will update over time and be available as a graph 
with all its subcomponents also shown. (2) The relation-
ship of CARS with NEWS was important to clarify. We 
have now designed our risk score to use NEWS in the first 
instance and then incorporate blood test results as and 
when available. About one-fourth of patients do not have 
a blood test results. (3) We have decided to present the 
score as a % (0–100) without descriptive labels (eg, low/
medium/high). (4) The score will be visible on the elec-
tronic patient record but will not be a ‘pop-up’ alert. We 
are now working with both NHS trusts, taking a staged 
approach to implementing CARS as a quality improve-
ment programme and we continue to involve staff and 
SU/Cs. The qualitative work reported here continues 
to map the process, identify early problems and support 
solutions.
The process of involvement of stakeholders within inter-
ventions is challenging and we can usefully reflect on the 
limitations of our efforts. For staff, finding time for their 
quality input was hard and while we achieved this through 
flexible approaches to recruitment, venues and timings, 
the process revealed warnings about the ‘unfinished 
business’ and ‘unanswered questions’ that staff still have 
about implementation. With respect to SU/Cs, we can 
refer to notions of an involvement hierarchy of ‘consul-
tation, collaboration, and user-control’10 to critique our 
approach. We predominantly ‘consulted’; however, we 
extended this to ‘collaboration’ with our steering group 
members who maintained input throughout. Much of 
the implementation and research took place at individual 
sites, integrated into daily hospital working, mirroring 
iterative quality improvement process. Including SU/Cs 
in this is fraught with difficulty and is currently rare in 
healthcare.11 Nevertheless as healthcare is increasingly 
using computer-aided decision support systems as a key to 
achieving gains in quality and patient safety,12 we suggest 
that codesign is necessary to maximise the successful 
implementation.
Conclusions
Staff and patients had important, often complex, insights 
to support the development and implementation of CARS 
which need to be addressed if CARS is to be successfully 
used in routine practice.
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